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COMMENT 
“REASONABLE SUSPICION PLUS”: 
A FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
CHIEF JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI’S 
CONCERNS OF MASS 
SURVEILLANCE WITHOUT 
COMPROMISING POLICE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
TYLER R. SMITH*
And by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and 
regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations 
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of 
constitutional regulation.1
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. Sociology, 2003, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.  I would like to thank 
my parents Ruth and Stephen for their boundless love and support.  I am especially grateful to 
Professor Wes Porter for his guidance throughout the writing process, and I credit him with the 
“Plus” idea in this Comment.  My friends Dan Blom and Brian Casido, as well as Professor Ed 
Baskauskas did an excellent job of editing on a very tight schedule.  And last, but not least, thank 
you to all my good friends and professors at GGU for always inspiring me. 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968). 
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INTRODUCTION
Global Positioning Systems2 (GPS) provide law enforcement3 with 
a powerful tool to covertly investigate criminal networks.4  These 
networks, however, are often themselves technologically sophisticated 
and thus able to elude police surveillance.5  GPS monitoring has drawn 
substantial criticism recently as police, in many jurisdictions, may utilize 
the technology without a search warrant; the issue has boiled down to 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant in the first 
place.6
2 See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 3117(b) (Westlaw 2011) (defining a mobile tracking device 
as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
object”).  The United States Department of Defense began development of GPS in the mid-1970s.  
The technology, which went into operation in 1995 under management of the United States Air 
Force, utilizes satellite “constellations” to communicate “highly accurate, real-time, all weather” 
information to military and civilian users. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING 
SYSTEM (GPS), at V-144 (1999), available at
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY1999/pdf/99gps.pdf (“DoD approved the NAVSTAR GPS 
program in December 1973. Full-scale development began in June 1979.”). 
3 Law enforcement agencies include federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as state and local law enforcement. 
Although “law enforcement” and “police” are used interchangeably throughout this Comment, 
“agent” is used to denote a DEA or FBI agent, whereas “officer” denotes a state or local police 
officer.  The distinction is important in order to accurately discuss facts of actual cases.  For 
simplicity, however, “officer(s)” and “police” will be used instead of “agent(s)” in any hypothetical 
discussion or general analysis of the rules. 
4 The court of appeals decisions that this Comment discusses each involved a fact pattern in 
which the defendant was involved in either a drug manufacturing operation or drug trafficking 
(supply) operation.  These drug rings typically require vehicular movement, whether it be back and 
forth to a marijuana grow site (or methamphetamine laboratory), or to transport the contraband from 
one location to another.  See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 458 (N.D.N.Y. 
2005) (discussing the difficulty of surveilling Hell’s Angels: “They frequently reside at locations 
owned or rented by others, and use other people’s names to register vehicles and obtain utilities and 
services, in an attempt to avoid identification by law enforcement. Jecko stated that Hell’s Angels 
often reside in rural locations, where stationery surveillance could easily be detected. They monitor 
police frequencies using scanners and use counter-surveillance techniques, such as periodically 
photographing surrounding areas in order to discover law enforcement surveillance equipment such 
as pole cameras.”); see also United States v. Dadanovic, No. 09-63-ART, 2010 WL 3620251, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010) (discussing how several suspects of a particular investigation lived in rural 
areas so that officers following the suspects in a police car could have easily alerted the suspects). 
5 See Frank J. Marine, The Threats Posed by Transnational Crimes and Organized Crime 
Groups, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE COMBAT OF ORGANIZED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 25 (1999), 
available at www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no54/no54.pdf (“[M]odern advanced 
telecommunications and information systems that are used in legitimate . . . activity can also be used 
by criminal networks to improve their own communication and to quickly carry out criminal 
transactions . . . .”). 
6 See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that neither the 
installation of the GPS device nor the subsequent monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights); United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
held in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, that police do not need a 
warrant in order to utilize GPS devices in a criminal investigation.7  In 
his dissent to denial of rehearing en banc,8 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski 
fervently forewarned of the dangerous new precedent created by the 
court’s decision: “The needs of law enforcement . . . are quickly making 
personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have come a bit later than 
predicted, but it’s here at last.”9  But Nineteen Eighty-Four,10 George 
Orwell’s dystopian novel that prognosticates a police state where the 
government—”Big Brother”—keeps a close watch over its citizens, is an 
unfair comparison to the current reality of GPS monitoring.11
Nevertheless, for many immigrants to this country, including Judge 
Kozinski,12 living under a police state has been more reality than fiction, 
and the admonition should not be ignored.  This Comment addresses the 
concern about “mass surveillance” with a proposed rule that would 
require police, as a condition precedent, to articulate their reasonable
2010) (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked in the suspect’s driveway 
was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) 
(No. 10-7515); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the prolonged 
surveillance aided by GPS technology was a search because it painted a detailed picture of the 
suspect’s life), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 
10A760); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating, in dictum, that had 
the defendant not lacked standing to contest the matter, a search would still not be found to have 
occurred when police used GPS to monitor a truck they believed was being used in a drug trafficking 
operation); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a search did not 
take place when police used a GPS device to learn where their suspect had traveled). 
7 Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215. 
8 En banc means, “With all judges present and participating; in full court.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 606 (9th ed. 2009).  Because of its size, the Ninth Circuit ordinarily uses a limited en 
banc court, consisting of the Chief Judge of the circuit plus ten additional judges drawn by lot from 
the pool of active judges.  Rarely, a case heard by a limited en banc court may be reheard by the full 
court. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (Westlaw 2011); Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 
92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (authorizing limited en banc courts for courts of appeals having more than 
fifteen active judges). 
9 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 
10, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
10 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
11 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough 
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”). 
12 Judge Kozinski was born in Communist Romania, where he lived until he was twelve. 
Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2004), available at
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/feature_bazelon_janfeb04.msp; Pineda-Moreno 
II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“To those of us who have lived under a totalitarian 
regime, there is an eerie feeling of déjà vu.”). 
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suspicion and need for the device in a written declaration and to comply 
with temporal and spatial limitations on use of the device. 
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Knotts that a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police electronically 
monitor his or her movements on public roads without a search 
warrant.13  The Court reasoned that when individuals travel on public 
roads they “voluntarily convey[] [information about their travels] to 
anyone who want[s] to look.”14  Since the privacy protections afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment15 cannot be applied when there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy,16 the Knotts Court held that the 
monitoring that took place with a beeper device was constitutionally 
valid.17
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly unambiguous ruling 
regarding warrantless18 use of electronic tracking devices in Knotts,
today there is ardent disagreement about the constitutional limitations on 
GPS monitoring.19  In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit likened the 
four-month-long GPS surveillance operation to the beeper monitoring 
that had occurred in Knotts, and accordingly held that the warrantless 
surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment.20  In United States v. 
Maynard, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia distinguished Knotts from the facts before it involving a 
13 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding that monitoring of a suspect’s movements on public 
roads is “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment”). 
14 Id. at 281-82 (“When [the suspect] travelled over the public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he 
exited from public roads onto private property.”). 
15 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. 
18 The semantic difference between “unwarranted” and “warrantless” is important to note: 
“warrantless” refers to police actions conducted in the absence of a search warrant, whereas 
“unwarranted” means unfounded. 
19 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; compare Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515), with United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 
10-1259, 10A760). 
20 Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (concluding that one does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when one travels on public thoroughfares), with Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 
at 1216 n.2 (“We, like the Seventh Circuit, believe that ‘[s]hould [the] government someday decide 
to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.’”). 
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twenty-eight-day surveillance operation.  “The intrusion such 
[prolonged] monitoring makes into the subject’s private affairs stands in 
stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts.”21  The 
evident circuit split prompted the United States Supreme Court to settle 
the matter;22 on November 8, 2011, the Court heard oral arguments in 
United States v. Jones (formerly United States v. Maynard).23
However, if the Court rules that GPS monitoring constitutes a per-se 
search24—that is, that it requires a search warrant regardless of the 
amount of time for which it is used25—then this powerful surveillance 
tool would be sapped of its utility in many situations.26  The Justice 
Department argued this important point in its petition to the Supreme 
Court:
Although in some investigations the government could establish 
probable cause and obtain a warrant before using a GPS device, 
federal law enforcement agencies frequently use tracking devices early 
in investigations, before suspicions have ripened into probable cause. 
The court of appeals’ decision prevents law enforcement officers from 
using GPS devices in an effort to gather information to establish
21 Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85 (discussing the monitoring of a suspect’s movements 
with a beeper device during a single journey), with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (discussing the 
monitoring of a suspect’s movements with a GPS device continually over a twenty-eight-day 
period). 
22 See Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 
6:32 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/ (“What the Court is now 
being asked to decide is, first, whether a GPS track is a ‘search,’ under the Constitution’s Fourth 
Amendment, and when might the continuous monitoring of a track become an invalid search if 
police do it without having a search warrant.”). 
23 Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, No. 10–1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 
2011), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf; see
Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/ (“Lawrence Maynard’s 
companion case did not raise the GPS issue; that was an issue for Antoine Jones in a consolidated 
case.  The government sought rehearing only as to Jones and the GPS question.”). 
24 A “per-se search” means that regardless of the duration or the manner in which it is used, 
GPS monitoring is a search for all purposes and thus requires a showing of probable cause before 
any GPS monitoring can occur.  For example, in Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 n.6, the D.C. Circuit 
stated that “[o]ne federal district court and two state courts have also held use of a GPS device is not 
per se a search, but none was presented with the argument that prolonged use of a GPS device to 
track an individual’s movements is meaningfully different from short-term surveillance.” 
25 There are, concededly, instances where the probable cause requirement would not create 
this dilemma for police.  For example, in Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, the investigating officers did have 
probable cause to believe that their suspects were involved in an intricate criminal drug conspiracy.  
The validity of the monitoring was challenged because the search warrant they obtained in order to 
utilize the GPS device expired after ten days, but the monitoring lasted for twenty-eight days. 
26 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed 
Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24. 
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probable cause, which will seriously impede the government’s ability 
to investigate leads and tips on drug trafficking, terrorism, and other 
crimes.27
It is imperative that the Court recognize these consequences of a per-se 
ruling and articulate a prophylactic rule that delineates when, where, and 
how police may use GPS without a search warrant.28
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should establish a 
new rule, “Reasonable Suspicion Plus,” that would require police to state 
in a sworn declaration particularized reasoning for use of a GPS device, 
but that would not require them to obtain a search warrant.  The benefits 
of the proposed rule would be threefold: (1) temporal and spatial 
limitations would assure that GPS technology is utilized responsibly; (2) 
the declaration would serve as a procedural obstacle requiring police to 
show good cause for using the device; and (3) when the declaration is 
registered with the district attorney’s office it would provide a tangible 
record, facilitating judicial review if a defendant later contests the 
legitimacy of the operation. 
Part I examines the concept of “a reasonable expectation of privacy” 
in the context of how the police use new technologies to monitor 
suspects’ movements.  Part II dissects the shortcomings of those 
decisions but also points to valid considerations and concerns that arose 
in those cases.  Part III proposes a model rule that can serve as a 
guidepost for appropriate use of GPS surveillance: “Reasonable 
Suspicion Plus.”  There are valid concerns on both sides of the 
argument,29 and the rule that this Comment proposes would address
27 See id.
28 See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but 
when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that where 
electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise would (that is, less than the 
principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our 
bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—is in my view indefensible. 
The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”). 
29 Proponents of GPS monitoring worry that if a warrant is required before police can utilize 
the device, then their ability to use the device “before suspicions have ripened into probable cause” 
will be diminished.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. 
filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24.  Advocates of requiring a warrant for GPS 
surveillance worry that without the procedural safeguards required by the Fourth Amendment, police 
will arbitrarily use GPS technology.  See Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and the 
consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. Some day, soon, we may 
wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-
7515). 
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those concerns, while maintaining constitutionality and deference to 
Supreme Court precedent. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: FACTS AND ANALYSES
In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit examined 
whether the attachment of a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, which 
was parked in the suspect’s driveway at the time, constituted a search.30
The case involved Drug Enforcement Agency agents whose suspicions 
were aroused upon observing a group of men purchasing a large quantity 
of a particular fertilizer commonly used to help grow marijuana.31
Without a search warrant, the agents went onto the driveway of one of 
the suspects and attached a GPS device to the undercarriage of his 
vehicle.32  The subsequent GPS monitoring lasted four months.33
Although the agents had also attached GPS devices while the Jeep 
of the defendant had been parked on public streets, the court correctly 
distinguished those instances from the attachment that took place in the 
defendant’s driveway.34  Surprisingly,35 the government conceded that 
the vehicle was parked within the curtilage36 but nevertheless maintained
30 If these actions were a search, then the agents would not have been permitted to take such 
actions in the absence of a warrant. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
31 Id. at 1213. 
32 Although the agents in Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1214, attached the devices “both 
while [it] was parked in his driveway and while it was parked public areas, such as a street and a 
public parking lot,” the Ninth Circuit was interested only in those instances where the agents had 
attached the devices to the vehicle while it was parked in the driveway. 
33 Id. at 1213. 
34 See generally id. at 1215 (finding that the instances where the agents had attached the GPS 
devices to the vehicle while it was parked on public streets to be an issue foreclosed by United States 
v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
35 See Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari Filed in Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit GPS 
Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petition-
for-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-gps-case/ (“The puzzling part about the panel 
decision in Pineda-Moreno was that it essentially undid the government’s concession: It held that the 
warrantless search was okay even though the driveway was concededly part of the curtilage. That’s 
wrong, in my view. The government’s concession should have lost the case for them, and the Ninth 
Circuit was wrong to bend over backwards to undo the concession.”). 
36 In Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215, the Ninth Circuit noted that this concession had 
been made earlier by the government before the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon.
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that the agents’ actions did not intrude upon the defendant’s 
constitutionally protected privacy rights.37
The curtilage of the home is the part of property that so immediately 
surrounds the home that courts will afford it the same Fourth 
Amendment protections as the home itself.38  However, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the government’s assessment and held that despite the 
agents’ entry upon the defendant’s curtilage to attach the device, there 
was no invasion of privacy.39  Since the defendant had not taken any 
preventive measures to keep people away—his curtilage displayed no 
“features to prevent someone standing in the street from seeing the entire 
driveway”—he had effectively surrendered his privacy expectation with 
respect to that area, according to the Ninth Circuit.40  Likening the GPS 
monitoring that took place over the subsequent months to that which 
occurred with the beeper device in Knotts, the court quickly found the 
matter to be foreclosed and upheld the conviction.41
In a case with facts similar to Pineda-Moreno, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that “prolonged”42 warrantless GPS surveillance violates the 
Fourth Amendment.43  In United States v. Maynard, officers believing 
two men were involved in a drug-selling conspiracy attached a GPS 
device to one of the men’s vehicles and monitored its movements 
continually over a twenty-eight-day period.44  The D.C. Circuit found 
37 Id. at 1215 (“In sum, Pineda-Moreno cannot show that the agents invaded an area in which 
he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they walked up his driveway and attached the 
tracking device to his vehicle. Because the agents did not invade such an area, they conducted no 
search, and Pineda-Moreno can assert no Fourth Amendment violation.”). 
38 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (“In this case, had a [government] 
agent thought it useful to enter the [suspect’s] residence to verify that the [property] was actually in 
the house and had he done so surreptitiously and without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would 
have engaged in an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes 
of the Amendment, the result is the same where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously 
employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation 
from outside the curtilage of the house.”). 
39 Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215 (“In sum, Pineda-Moreno cannot show that the agents 
invaded an area in which he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they walked up his 
driveway and attached the tracking device to his vehicle. Because the agents did not invade such an 
area, they conducted no search, and Pineda-Moreno can assert no Fourth Amendment violation.”). 
40 Id.
41 See generally id. at 1216-17 (“We conclude that the police did not conduct an 
impermissible search of Pineda-Moreno’s car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking 
devices.”).
42 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[P]rolonged GPS 
monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—short 
perhaps of his spouse.”), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 
10-1259, 10A760). 
43 Id.
44 In Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555, the officers did, in fact, have probable cause to believe that 
8
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that, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Knotts,45 when data about 
one’s movements is compiled over a prolonged period of time, the 
aggregate of that information paints an “intimate” portrait of one’s life.46
Since the GPS monitoring in Maynard lasted twenty-eight days, it 
was, according to the D.C. Circuit, prolonged and consequently an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.47  The D.C. Circuit 
reversed the conviction of the registered owner of the vehicle, Antoine 
Jones.48  In November 2011, the Justice Department argued the matter 
before United States Supreme Court in United States v. Jones;49 the 
Court’s decision, it is hoped, will settle both Maynard and Pineda-
Moreno.50
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WHEN IT APPLIES AND WHEN A 
VIOLATION IS EXCUSED
It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement 
agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably 
practicable.51
Jones was involved in the operation and were issued a search warrant to use the GPS device to 
monitor his movements in order to learn more about the criminal network in which he was involved.  
Jones challenged the use of the device because the warrant had expired but police continued to use 
the tracking device to collect evidence after its expiration. 
45 Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983) (discussing the monitoring of 
a suspect’s movements with a beeper device during a single journey), with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 
(discussing the monitoring of a suspect’s movements with a GPS device continually over a twenty-
eight-day period). 
46 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
47 Id. at 563. 
48 Id.
49 Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 
2011), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf. 
50 See United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (granting certiorari); Pineda-Moreno I,
591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); see 
also Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 PM), 
www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/ (“What the Court is now being 
asked to decide is, first, whether a GPS track is a ‘search,’ under the Constitution’s Fourth 
Amendment, and when might the continuous monitoring of a track become an invalid search if 
police do it without having a search warrant.”). 
51 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (referring to searches and seizures 
conducted incident to arrest), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). 
Despite Trupiano being overruled by Rabinowitz, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), the Court 
recognized the need to retain a variation of the “wherever reasonably practicable” principle that 
Trupiano had articulated. 
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The Fourth Amendment has long been a cherished keystone 
buttressing our right to live free of the unwarranted prying eyes of the 
government.52  The amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.53
In the context of GPS monitoring, whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies should depend on where the device is attached and the duration 
for which the monitoring lasts.54  This section points to Court-created 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and instances in which the Court 
has drawn a line and declared the amendment does not apply.55
52 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (“The Fourth Amendment gives 
protection against unlawful searches and seizures . . . .  Its origin and history clearly show that it was 
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a 
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and 
the possession of his property . . . .”). 
53 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
54 See Brief for the United States at (I), United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed Aug. 
11, 2011), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_ 
Brief_Updates/10-1259_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf (addressing both “[w]hether the warrantless 
use of a GPS tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets 
violated the Fourth Amendment [and w]hether the government violated respondent’s Fourth 
Amendment rights by attaching the GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a valid warrant and 
without his consent”); see generally Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) 
(“Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant 
generalizations. ‘[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy 
constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.’”) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 712 (1984)). 
55 This Comment explores the landmark Supreme Court cases Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2419 (2011), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979), in which the Court established 
exceptions to the general proscription against warrantless searches.  This Comment also looks at 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, in which the Court refused to carve out an exception to the rule, and explains 
how the rule from that case applies to the context of GPS monitoring.  Throughout this Comment, 
however, the holding from United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983), that people do not 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to public movements is not looked at as an 
exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a helpful reminder of what exactly the Fourth 
Amendment aims to protect.  It provides a starting point that the Jones Court should be loath to 
oversimplify as the D.C. Circuit did in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760). 
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1.  The Limited Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Policy-Based 
Exceptions
A search or seizure occurs when a government agent intrudes upon 
an individual’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”56  However, the right to be free from searches and seizures is 
not absolute.57  As Justice Harlan first explained in Katz v. United States,
one must maintain an actual expectation of privacy that society would 
recognize as reasonable before the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
are triggered.58  While warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable,59 and thus generally prohibited by the amendment, the 
Supreme Court has recognized exceptions where the “societal costs of 
obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or risk of loss or 
destruction of evidence, [have] outweigh[ed] the reasons for prior 
recourse to a neutral magistrate.”60
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment dictates that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon [a showing of] probable cause.”61
Searches conducted in the absence of a warrant are per se 
unreasonable.62  If an officer conducts a warrantless search and needs to 
use evidence procured by that search at trial in order to convict, then the 
prosecutor must show that a recognized exception to the Fourth 
Amendment justified the warrantless intrusion.63  If the government 
56 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
57 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting only those searches deemed to be 
unreasonably intrusive).
58 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining the two-part test for 
whether courts will apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections: whether the individual who is 
challenging the government’s actions maintained an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
[if that] expectation [was] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  When a 
reviewing court finds that the individual’s expectation of privacy was in fact reasonable, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the government agent must have first obtained a search warrant before 
interfering with the individual.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting only those 
searches deemed to be unreasonably intrusive). 
59 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has 
observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of 
a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
62 Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has observed that searches 
and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of a judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
63 See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (“[O]nly in ‘a few specifically established 
and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutional 
11
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ing to trial.
cannot meet this burden, the exclusionary rule precludes the evidence 
from being admitted at trial.64  Oftentimes, any other evidence collected 
after the constitutional violation is also prohibited from being used to 
prosecute the defendant.65  An early violation of the Fourth Amendment 
can thus prevent an otherwise sound criminal investigation from 
proceed 66
The exclusionary rule is a court-created remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations that aims to deter unjustified police intrusions.67
Because of this design, the Court has recognized instances in which the 
exclusion of evidence would not help deter similar future actions.68  In 
these few instances, the Court has created exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.69  Justice Rehnquist expressed this in Arizona v. Evans,
stating, “As with any remedial device, the rule’s application has been 
restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought 
most efficaciously served.  Where the exclusionary rule does not result in 
appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted.”70 The 
notion of deterrence is thus inseparable from any Fourth Amendment 
analysis.71  In the context of GPS monitoring, the exclusionary rule 
scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to conduct it. The burden rests on the State 
to show the existence of such an exceptional situation.”) (citation omitted). 
64 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
65 See id. at 391-92 (establishing what has come to be known as the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” concept). 
66 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988) (“The exclusionary rule prohibits 
introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search and of testimony 
concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search.”) (citation omitted); see generally
Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391-92 (1920) (establishing what has come to be known as the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” concept). 
67 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (“The exclusionary rule operates as a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights through the rule’s general deterrent effect.”).  But cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968) 
(“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, 
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from 
any criminal trial.”). 
68 See, e.g., Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1995) (“[T]he 
practice of denying criminal defendants an exclusionary remedy from Fourth Amendment violations 
when those errors occur despite the good faith of the Government actors does not require the 
affirmance of petitioner’s conviction in this case. Finding the deterrent remedy of suppression not 
compelled by the Fourth Amendment specifically relied on the ‘objectionable collateral consequence 
of [the] interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function’ in requiring a blanket 
exclusionary remedy for all violations and the relative ineffectiveness of such remedy to deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations in particular cases.”) (citations omitted). 
69 See, e.g., Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Ryder, 515 U.S. at 185-86. 
70 Evans, 514 U.S. at 11. 
71 See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] 
rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/7
2011] Reasonable Suspicion Plus 59 
should be used to prevent only those government actions that are 
unreasonable.72
The Supreme Court has established exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment by balancing the restrictions of the amendment against 
policy concerns such as police officer safety and the practicalities of law 
enforcement.73  The single-purpose-container rule was established in 
Arkansas v. Sanders as an adjunct to the plain-view doctrine.74  If an 
officer can infer the contents of a container based on its outward 
appearance, then the contents, like the container itself, are said to be in 
plain view, and the defendant is said to have forfeited his or her 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the container and its 
contents.75  Accordingly, an officer in such a situation does not need a 
search warrant in order to search or seize the container.76
In Chimel v. California,77 the Court established the search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement primarily in 
reaction to concerns about officer safety.78  The search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine permits officers to conduct warrantless searches provided they 
are conducted incident, in both time and place, to the arrest.79  The 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures: ‘The rule is calculated to 
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the 
only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”) (quoting Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
72 But cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“This case does not 
require us to, and therefore we do not, decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual 
surveillance would be a search subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760). 
73 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (excusing a search and seizure if the 
place searched might contain destructible evidence or a weapon and it was within the lunging 
distance of the arrestee), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (justifying a warrantless, but brief, stop and pat down for weapons provided 
the officer had reasonable suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal activity). 
74 The Court explained in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981), that a container 
can make its contents obvious to an observer by its distinctive configuration or otherwise. 
75 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979). 
76 In the footnote credited with formally establishing the rule, Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13, 
the Court provided two examples of single-purpose containers: a burglary kit and a gun case.  “Thus, 
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support 
any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward 
appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to ‘plain view,’ thereby 
obviating the need for a warrant.”  Id. 
77 Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
78 See id. at 762-63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order 
to resist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the 
arrest itself frustrated.”). 
79 Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
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rationale of the rule is to protect officers from arrestees who might, out 
of desperation, lunge for a weapon to effect their escape.80  Despite the 
persistence of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine from Chimel, the rule 
leaves police with little practical guidance;81 an officer cannot truly 
know whether constitutional boundaries have been crossed until a judge 
later makes the determination.82  Nevertheless, exceptions to the warrant 
requirement generally require that the scope of the intrusion be limited to 
the need.83
The public’s right to be free from unnecessary intrusions is best met 
with carefully drawn preconditions.84  In Arizona v. Gant, Justice 
Stevens stated, “That limitation, which continues to define the 
boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to 
arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting 
officers . . . .”85  The Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of 
governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation.”86
Terry reflected the Court’s belief that a prophylactic rule that retains the 
traditional reasonableness standard is important in order for the 
exception to serve as a helpful guideline for police.87  In the context of 
80 Id.
81 A motion to suppress is granted when the search is not proximate in time and place to the 
arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he search of [the 
defendant’s] car was characterized by neither the spatial nor the temporal proximity to the place and 
time of the arrest required to constitute a valid search incident to arrest.”); United States v. Johnson, 
16 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding the defendant’s briefcase was not seized incident to the arrest 
because it was not in the area of his immediate control at the time of arrest). 
82 See Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing 
Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (“As with a police 
officer’s (or magistrate’s) before-the-fact assessment of the legality of a planned search, it is not ex 
post reality (that the defendant was or was not committing a crime or hiding evidence of crime) that 
determines the substantive outcome of the suppression motion; it is the ex ante perspective of the 
officer.  If the officer did not reasonably expect to find evidence, then the evidence that she did in 
fact find should be suppressed at trial.”); see generally Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional 
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular, 
for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held 
that a search in that area would be unreasonable.”). 
83 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“Thus, evidence may not be 
introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related 
in scope to the justification for their initiation.”). 
84 See generally Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court 
creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the 
weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”). 
85 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009). 
86 Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29. 
87 See id. at 31 (Harlan J., concurring) (“[W]hat is said by this Court today will serve as 
initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important 
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 in a new rule.
GPS monitoring, that wisdom should endure, since spatial and temporal 
limitations could easily be identified 88
2. Reasonable Suspicion: A Practical Standard 
When an investigation is in its early stages, it would be prudent to 
allow police to take minimally intrusive yet proactive steps to 
corroborate their suspicions rather than requiring that they demonstrate 
probable cause89 sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant.90  In 
Terry, the Supreme Court analyzed whether an officer’s actions of 
stopping and frisking two men after observing their suspicious behavior 
outside a storefront window violated their Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.91  The need for the officer 
to take preventive measures was plain, and the Terry Court recognized 
the dilemma the probable cause requirement could create.92  Although 
the officer’s observations hardly amounted to probable cause, the Court 
held that the officer’s actions of detaining the men and patting them 
down for weapons—actions that would ordinarily be considered a search 
triggering the warrant requirement—were nonetheless justified.93  If an 
officer were to be prohibited from searching a suspicious individual who 
the officer suspected—but lacked probable cause to believe—was about 
new field of law develops.”). 
88 GPS monitoring, like a search incident to arrest, involves both temporal parameters 
(“prolonged surveillance”) and spatial parameters (attachment of a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle 
while it is parked in his or her curtilage). See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2629, 
2635 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may 
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s 
implication . . . that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise 
would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private action)—
or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—
is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”). 
89 In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949), the Supreme Court attempted 
to define probable cause: “[Probable cause] mean[s] more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists 
where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” (citing Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
90 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
91 Id. at 6.  The officer in Terry observed the men alternately walk back and forth past a 
storefront, peering in through the windows, appearing to scope the store out for a robbery. 
92 See id. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically 
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”). 
93 Id. at 21 (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point 
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). 
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to commit a crime, then the officer might be left with no other option but 
to wait until actual criminal behavior began.94  In such a situation, the 
warrant requirement is both impractical and runs counter to the public’s 
interest in law enforcement.95
The Court’s solution to the dilemma was to lower the prerequisite 
probable cause standard to a less-stringent one of “reasonable 
suspicion.”96  Under Terry, if an officer reasonably suspects an 
individual of wrongdoing, based on specific and articulable facts,97 then 
the officer can temporarily detain that person and pat him or her down 
for weapons.98  A Terry stop is thus a warrantless but founded 
investigation that is constitutionally permissible in the interest of 
proactive police work.99
3. A Balancing Test to Meet Constitutional Requirements 
The Terry Court derived its authority to create the new reasonable-
suspicion standard from an earlier Supreme Court decision, Camara v. 
Municipal Court.100  In Camara, the Court used a balancing approach to 
circumvent the Fourth Amendment in a matter involving health 
inspectors and their need to enter and inspect residences without 
warrants.101  These particular intrusions, the Court noted, were justified 
only because the harm caused was minimal when compared to the need 
for city officials to conduct these health inspections in the absence of 
search warrants.102
94 See id. at 35 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Police officers need not wait until they see a 
person actually commit a crime before they are able to ‘seize’ that person.”). 
95 Id. at 15 (majority opinion) (“Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary 
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a 
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.”). 
96 Id.; accord Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“We have described 
reasonable suspicion simply as a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person 
stopped of criminal activity and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found.”) (citation omitted). 
97 An officer’s reasonable suspicion may not be based simply on a hunch or predicated on 
behavior like nervousness. “And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such 
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light 
of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
98 Id.
99 See id.
100 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving the right of city health 
inspectors to make warrantless inspections of home). 
101 Id.
102 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional 
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The balancing test is fundamentally a sliding scale of 
reasonableness.103  “[T]he Supreme Court indicated that the level of 
cause required for such inspections could be determined only by 
balancing the need to search against the scope of the invasion.”104  If an 
officer’s actions are unnecessarily invasive, and that invasion is not 
offset by a greater government need,105 then the search or seizure is 
unreasonable and, consequently, cannot be justified in the absence of a 
warrant.106  If, on the other hand, there exists a compelling need to 
investigate, and the officer’s actions intrude only to the extent necessary 
to corroborate his or her suspicions, then a court will find those actions 
reasonable.107
Despite these Fourth Amendment caveats, the Supreme Court 
decisions all reflect instances where particular needs outweighed threats 
to the protected interests.108  In Chimel, the need for officer safety109
prompted the Court to construct the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.110  And in Terry, the lower reasonable-suspicion standard was 
justified by the requirement that the intrusion be limited.111  The Court 
recognized that the all-or-nothing implications of the probable cause  
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches 
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 
requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must 
be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”). 
103 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 977, 1011 (2004) (“[T]he balancing test [from Camara] has devolved into an assessment of 
the relative strength of the governmental and individual interests, with the Court’s thumb pressing 
heavily on the government’s side of the scale.” (footnote omitted)). 
104 JOSEPH D. GRANO & LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 28 
(4th ed. 2004). 
105 The limitations upon the scope are a malleable border proportionate to an officer’s need.  
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to 
guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal 
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When such 
conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from 
evidence in criminal trials.”). 
106 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court creates a 
prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the weighing of 
the rule’s benefits against its costs.”). 
107 See id. (“When this Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional 
right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”). 
108 See id.
109 In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2419 (2011), the Court also considered the need for officers to be able to prevent arrestees from 
destroying evidence. 
110 Id.
111 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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requirement could run counter to more important policy 
considerations.112
4. Modern Technologies Compounding Traditional Problems 
In the rapidly evolving world of modern technology, the Fourth 
Amendment becomes vulnerable to the subjective whims and knowledge 
of the presiding judge.113  The Supreme Court has, nevertheless, 
continued to apply Justice Harlan’s reasonableness test114 to newly 
developed technology utilized in surveillance operations.115  In Knotts,
officers used a beeper device to monitor their suspect’s vehicular 
movements, eventually pinpointing the clandestine location of the 
suspect’s drug lab.116  Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated, 
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”117
The Court thus held that the use of the beeper device did not intrude 
upon the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, since the technology did 
not raise any “constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not 
also raise.”118
In United States v. Karo, the Court drew another bright line with 
respect to technology and the Fourth Amendment.119  This decision, 
however, underscored the principle that the home—and the area 
112 See generally id.
113 The problem is that the test is “largely circular: a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when the courts decide to protect it through the Fourth Amendment. . . .  [I]n a high-tech 
world, a judge must ruminate over the importance of privacy and the meaning of ‘reasonableness.’”  
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808-09 (2004) (citing Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional 
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001). 
114 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
115 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal 
imaging device to detect the temperature inside a home defeats the occupant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding that police use of 
an airplane to view marijuana plants in defendant’s backyard from 1,000 feet overhead was not a 
search under the Fourth amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (evaluating an 
electronic monitoring device to reveal details about the interior of a suspect’s home); United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (evaluating the use of an electronic beeper device to monitor 
movement on public roadways). 
116 Knotts, 460 U.S. 276. 
117 Id. at 282. 
118 Id. at 285. 
119 See Karo, 468 U.S. 705. 
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immediately surrounding it—deserves the utmost Fourth Amendment 
protection.120  In Karo, officers placed a tracking device inside a can of 
ether as part of their investigation.121  When the suspect carried the can 
into his home, the device transmitted information about the interior of the 
residence.122  The Court found this kind of surveillance to be an 
unreasonable intrusion because “the Government surreptitiously 
employ[ed] an electronic device to obtain information that it could not 
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.”123
With respect to tracking devices, one of the constitutional limitations is 
the border of the curtilage.124
What remains unclear, however, is whether going onto the curtilage 
to install a tracking device is constitutionally valid when officers can see 
the area from beyond the curtilage.125  In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth 
Circuit held that these actions do not automatically violate the Fourth 
Amendment.126  Also unclear is how the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Maynard can be reconciled with the long-held understanding that one 
does not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
one’s movement on public thoroughfares.127  Since 2007, five federal 
120 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat 
emanating from the home was a search because it was not something that could be done by ordinary 
human senses and because the technology was not in general use).  But see United States v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular 
reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the 
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is 
put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.”). 
121 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. 
122 Id. at 727. 
123 Id. at 715. 
124 Id. But see Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 (“[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be 
resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation 
by people passing by.”). 
125 Compare United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked within the 
curtilage was not a violation of his Fourth amendment rights in part because “the driveway had 
no . . . features to prevent someone standing in the street from seeing the entire driveway”), petition
for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515), with Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (concluding that the 
officers actions were constitutionally impermissible because they learned information with the 
tracking device that they otherwise could not have from beyond the curtilage). 
126 Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215, 1217. 
127 Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760), with United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that monitoring of a suspect’s movements on public roads 
is “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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courts of appeals128 have addressed the issue of GPS surveillance, yet no 
uniform principle has emerged.129  But although the Ninth and D.C. 
Circuit cases involved curious analyses that contorted traditional 
understandings of how surveillance technology interacts with the Fourth 
Amendment,130 the rift can and should be mended with a blend of 
pertinent Supreme Court precedent.131
II. ANALYSIS
In 1983, when “the world [was] explosive and hence, more difficult 
and unfavorable”132 than it had been since World War II, the Supreme 
Court held that the possibility of mass surveillance was insufficient 
reason to require police to obtain search warrants before monitoring a 
suspect with an electronic device.133  The idea of using the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to prevent a police state 
128 See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2011); Pineda-Moreno I, 591 
F.3d 1212; Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
129 See Hernandez, 647 F.3d at 219 (concluding that neither the installation of the GPS device 
nor the subsequent monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Pineda-Moreno 
I, 591 F.3d at 1215, 1217 (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked in the 
suspect’s driveway was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 
(holding that the prolonged surveillance aided by GPS technology was a search because it painted a 
detailed picture of the suspect’s life); Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (stating, in dictum, that had the 
defendant not lacked standing to contest the matter, a search would still not be found to have 
occurred when police used GPS to monitor a truck they believed was being used in a drug trafficking 
operation); Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (holding that a search did not take place when police used a 
GPS device to learn where their suspect had traveled to). 
130 See Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215; United States v. Jones, No. 08-3034, slip op. at 4 
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2010) (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is, as concluded in 
Knotts, zero. The sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”). 
131 The “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” rule that this Comment proposes would restore the more 
traditional understanding of the curtilage from United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) 
(noting that under common law, the curtilage is afforded the same sacrosanct Fourth Amendment 
protection as the home itself), and would apply the reasonable-suspicion standard from Terry to 
permit limited intrusions.  Moreover, if the Court identifies the point at which a GPS monitoring 
lasts an unreasonable period of time, the Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, decision could be respected without 
expressly discounting the D.C. Circuit’s concern about prolonged surveillance. 
132 “Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as explosive and 
hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.” Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold 
War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, (Jul. 7, 2008, 
11:28 AM), www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm (quoting Mikhail Gorbachev, Feb. 1986). 
133 See generally Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices 
as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”). 
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reminiscent of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four134 from becoming 
a reality seems prudent.135  But just as every motion to suppress must be 
based upon the particular facts of the case, so too should the Supreme 
Court evaluate GPS monitoring cautiously, with an eye toward what is 
actually occurring, not what could potentially occur.136  The current 
Court should recognize the Cold War context of Knotts and be wary of 
agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that the era of “dragnet type” mass 
surveillance is indeed upon us.137
When the Court agreed to review United States v. Jones on June 27, 
2011, it posed an additional question to be addressed at oral argument, 
one that the D.C. Circuit had not asked: “Whether the government 
violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights by installing the GPS 
tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his 
consent.”138  The Court likely posed this question so that it may address 
what the D.C. Circuit did not: the point in time at which a search goes 
from the “relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts”139 to an 
unreasonable intrusion that requires a search warrant.140
To resolve this question, the Court cannot simply conclude that GPS 
monitoring is or is not a search.  If the Court concludes that GPS 
monitoring is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, liberal minds 
would rightly fear further deterioration of the amendment,141 and 
134 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
135 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We are taking a giant leap into 
the unknown, and the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. 
Some day, soon, we may wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. 
Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
136 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) (“Fourth Amendment 
cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations. ‘[W]e have 
never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment.’”) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712). 
137 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether 
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”). 
138 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10–1259, 10A760). 
139 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
140 For analysis of what the Court’s intent might have been in posing this question, see Orin 
Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-to-
review-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/. 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“I concur in Chief Judge 
Kozinski’s dissent. I have served on this court for nearly three decades.  I regret that over that time 
the courts have gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the 
point at which it scarcely resembles the robust guarantor of our constitutional rights we knew when I 
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unchecked “dragnet type” mass surveillance might become an all-too-
real concern.  On the other hand, if the Court distinguishes Jones from 
Knotts in order to say GPS monitoring is a per-se search, law 
enforcement throughout the country could be deprived of the essential 
surveillance tool when it may be needed most: the early stages of an 
investigation.142  Either way, legitimate public policy concerns would 
ferment.  Requiring police to show “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” would 
prevent police from using GPS technology in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A. THE DILEMMA CREATED BY REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE
The principle objective of most surveillance operations is to gather 
evidence amounting to probable cause sufficient to obtain a search or 
arrest warrant.143  If an officer cannot state with any particularity the 
location of the intended search, it is unlikely that a warrant will be 
issued.144  With GPS, the information (i.e., location) needed for the 
affidavit is the very information the officer seeks to learn from the 
device.145  In its petition for certiorari, the Department of Justice 
explained the problematic implications of Maynard:
[T]he court of appeals’ opinion gives no guidance to law enforcement 
officers about when a warrant is required.  Use of a GPS device for a 
few hours (or perhaps a few days) is presumably still acceptable under 
Knotts.  But the court’s opinion offers no workable standard for law 
enforcement officers to determine how long a GPS device must 
remain in place before their investigation reveals enough information 
to offend a reasonable expectation of privacy (and therefore become a 
Fourth Amendment search).146
joined the bench. . . . Today’s decision is but one more step down the gloomy path the current 
Judiciary has chosen to follow with regard to the liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Sadly, I predict that there will be many more such decisions to come. I dissent.”) (paragraph breaks 
and citations omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
142 Res judicata is “[a]n issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision.” The 
Latin phrase translates to “a thing adjudicated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (9th ed. 2009). 
143 See generally Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
144 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring a “particular[] descri[ption] [of] the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”); accord Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 
204, 213 (1981) (“A search warrant, in contrast[,] is issued upon a showing of probable cause to 
believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place . . . .”). 
145 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. 
filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24-25. 
146 Id.
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When the Supreme Court decides Jones,147 it should take heed of this 
point and provide practical parameters as to how long GPS monitoring 
may last before it becomes prolonged.148  The discord amongst the 
circuits shows the need for Supreme Court clarification.  However, 
overly simplified clarification (e.g., GPS monitoring automatically 
violates the Fourth Amendment)149 would ignore the possibility that GPS 
monitoring can be limited in such a way as not to infringe upon a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.150
B. A SOLUTION FOR A CONVOLUTED MATTER
Requiring officers to articulate their reasonable suspicion in a 
written declaration before they are permitted to use GPS would help 
prevent unfettered abuse of the technology.151  A lower standard than 
probable cause, such as reasonable suspicion, would maintain 
constitutionality, provided the officers’ actions are not overly intrusive, 
and permit officers to perform the essential functions of their duty.152
The Terry Court applied the reasonable-suspicion standard because the 
logistics of the warrant requirement in the context of that case ran 
147 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10–1259, 10A760).  The D.C. Circuit upheld the 
conviction of Lawrence Maynard but reversed the conviction of Antoine Jones. Because the 
Department of Justice only petitioned the Supreme Court for review the reversal of Jones’s 
conviction, the name of the case changed. 
148 See Brief for the United States at (I), United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed Aug. 
11, 2011), 2011 WL 3561881 at *I (addressing both “[w]hether the warrantless use of a GPS 
tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the 
Fourth Amendment [and w]hether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights 
by attaching the GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his 
consent”).
149 See generally Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 n.6 (“One federal district court and two state 
courts have . . . held use of a GPS device is not per se a search, but none was presented with the 
argument that prolonged use of a GPS device to track an individual’s movements is meaningfully 
different from short-term surveillance.”) (citing United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009); Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 
1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)). 
150 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566-67. 
151 See generally Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion 
and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (“As with 
a police officer’s (or magistrate’s) before-the-fact assessment of the legality of a planned search, it is 
not ex post reality (that the defendant was or was not committing a crime or hiding evidence of 
crime) that determines the substantive outcome of the suppression motion; it is the ex ante 
perspective of the officer.  If the officer did not reasonably expect to find evidence, then the 
evidence that she did in fact find should be suppressed at trial.”). 
152 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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counter to public policy.153  The logistical policy considerations of GPS 
monitoring are similar to those in Terry in that law enforcement 
personnel should be permitted to safely corroborate, through minimally 
intrusive investigation,154 suspected criminal activity. 
The Supreme Court should adopt guidelines that would allow GPS 
devices to be used for defined periods of time before the warrantless 
monitoring must be discontinued.  The Court has previously 
demonstrated its willingness to draw bright-line temporal limitations on 
criminal procedure matters, and such a bright-line limitation in this 
context would alleviate the D.C. Circuit’s concern about prolonged GPS 
surveillance.155  Despite that concern, the D.C. Circuit expressly refused 
to specify the point at which the surveillance became prolonged.156
When the Supreme Court granted the Justice Department’s request for 
review, and asked “[w]hether the government violated respondent’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his 
vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent,”157 it indicated 
its discomfort with the all-or-nothing implications of the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding.158  The concern that prolonged GPS surveillance may be 
unconstitutional by virtue of its duration and intensity, however, is  
153 Id. at 20 (1968) (“But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily 
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which 
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant 
procedure.”).
154 The rule from Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, rested on the presumption that “[t]he scope of the 
search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).  This 
Comment proposes a rule with express limitations on the scope of a warrantless GPS investigation, 
but these limitations proceed under the presumption that utilization of the device is permissible ab
initio.
155 See generally Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. This Comment proposes a limitation on the 
number of days for which GPS could be used without a warrant. In Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, the D.C. 
Circuit noted that the police had actually obtained a GPS search warrant, but that it had expired after 
ten days.  The Supreme Court recently set a fourteen-day limitation to an issue involving Miranda 
rights. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (“The 14–day limitation meets [the 
defendant]’s concern that a break-in-custody rule lends itself to police abuse.”). 
156 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566 (“This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not, 
decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual surveillance would be a search subject to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
157 United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064, 3064 (2011). 
158 See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-
court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/ (discussing what the Court intended 
by posing this question). 
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legitimate,159 and the Court should adopt a rule that addresses this 
concern.
The Ninth Circuit, in Pineda-Moreno, was correct to evaluate the 
curtilage issue, but its decision departed from traditional understandings 
of that constitutionally protected area of the home.160  Regardless, 
entering onto a suspect’s driveway in order to attach a GPS device is the 
kind of unnecessary constitutional risk that could be avoided.  When it 
appears to an officer that a suspect’s vehicle may be parked within the 
curtilage, he or she should wait for the vehicle to be parked in a public 
area.161  Instead of viewing this as a hindrance to their surveillance 
operations, law enforcement should favor a bright-line rule that would 
help avoid the exclusionary rule’s crippling effect—dismissal of the 
charges against a defendant. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT NEW STANDARDS: REASONABLE
SUSPICION PLUS AND TEMPORAL LIMITS
The proposed rule begins with the premise that an officer has 
observed someone’s activities that led the officer to reasonably suspect 
that the individual is involved in criminal activity.  That the level of 
suspicion might not rise to the higher level of probable cause, however, 
would not preclude the officer from using a GPS device to facilitate the 
investigation.  However, at the outset of the investigation, the officer 
would be required to set forth an investigative need—in a written 
declaration under penalty of perjury162—articulating both what those 
159 Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 (“[A] search which is reasonable at 
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.”). 
160 See Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari Filed in Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit GPS 
Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petition-
for-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-gps-case/ (“The puzzling part about the panel 
decision in Pineda-Moreno was that it essentially undid the government’s concession: It held that the 
warrantless search was okay even though the driveway was concededly part of the curtilage. That’s 
wrong, in my view. The government’s concession should have lost the case for them, and the Ninth 
Circuit was wrong to bend over backwards to undo the concession.”). 
161 This Comment does not address issues of standing.  For instance, if an officer knows that a 
suspect’s vehicle is parked in the curtilage of someone else’s home, the suspect at trial would not be 
able to contest the officer’s intrusion since it was not upon his own curtilage.  For detailed analysis 
of standing in this context, see Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment 
Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (2007). 
162 “Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury” are described in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 
(Westlaw 2011): 
Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or 
requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, 
evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, 
statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a 
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suspicions are based upon and why utilizing GPS would be more 
beneficial than traditional approaches.163  Requiring this written 
declaration is the “plus” condition precedent aimed at preventing 
arbitrary, and hence unreasonable, intrusions.  It would furthermore 
increase judicial economy by providing a tangible record that would be 
admissible at any suppression motion.  If an officer can in good faith164
attest to his or her investigative need for GPS technology and articulate 
specific factors and observations amounting to reasonable suspicion, then 
the limited utilization of GPS monitoring would be presumptively 
constitutional.165
Disallowing the attachment of GPS devices to vehicles parked on, 
or to vehicles that reasonably appear to be parked on, the curtilage of a 
suspect’s home would serve as a bright line for officers.166  This 
restriction would prevent officers from trampling the Fourth Amendment 
by ensuring that they do not cross the constitutional boundary protecting 
deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official 
other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, 
evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or 
statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of 
perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form: 
(1)  If executed without the United States: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under 
penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is 
true and correct. Executed on (date). 
(Signature)”.
(2)  If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: 
“I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct. Executed on (date). 
(Signature)”.
163 The proposed “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” rule could borrow language from 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2518(c) (Westlaw 2011), which provides that, when applying for a warrant to employ electronic 
surveillance, the affiant should clearly state “whether or not other investigative procedures have been 
tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous.”
164 Each enumeration of the rule is intended to incorporate the good-faith requirement; the 
officer must subjectively believe the facts he or she writes on the declaration amount to reasonable 
suspicion in each section of the rule. 
165 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (necessitating that reasonable suspicion 
be specific and articulable). 
166 See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness,
2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1026-27 (2004) (“[A]bsent objective criteria for measuring reasonableness, 
progressively intrusive actions have been and will continue to be allowed. This tendency is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the framers’ intent to protect individuals from unreasonable 
governmental intrusions. To avoid undermining that fundamental purpose, government officials need 
objective criteria to measure reasonableness. Justice Frankfurter was correct when he observed: ‘To 
say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all 
either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—
that the search must be reasonable.’”). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/7
2011] Reasonable Suspicion Plus 73 
the home.167  In conjunction with this spatial limitation, the new rule 
would also restrict the duration of GPS use to a reasonable period of 
time.
The written declaration, the “plus” aspect, would inquire into the 
legitimacy of the officer’s purpose by requiring that he or she attest to 
four aspects of the proposed investigation.  These “Reasonable Suspicion 
Plus” declarations might resemble the following: 
1.  The officer seeking to utilize a GPS monitoring device explains 
what led to his or her reasonable suspicion that a particular subject has 
recently engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in criminal 
activity.
2.  The officer articulates how monitoring the suspect’s vehicular 
movement and location would further the investigation or corroborate 
the suspicion. 
3.  The officer explains why employing a GPS monitoring device in 
this situation is superior, not just preferable, to traditional surveillance 
tactics.
4.  The officer attests that he or she will attach and activate the GPS 
device within ten days of submitting this declaration to the prosecuting 
attorney for the relevant jurisdiction,168 and that the device will be 
manually or automatically deactivated no later than fourteen days after 
the device is activated. 
The first aspect of the declaration would require the officer to 
express, in specific terms, what type of crime he or she suspects the 
subject is involved in.  Simply stating, however, that the officer suspects 
an individual of “illicit drug activity” would be insufficient because it is 
too vague; drug activity could mean drug use, manufacture, distribution, 
or simply association with known drug users.  If, on the other hand, the 
suspected criminal activity is the “manufacture of illicit drugs” or 
“trafficking in illegal drugs,” that could suffice because of its greater 
167 See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“These factors are useful 
analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant 
consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be 
placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
168 In its petition for certiorari in Jones, the Justice Department recognized that “[t]he warrant 
authorized the agents to install the device on the Jeep within ten days of the issuance of the warrant 
and only within the District of Columbia, but the agents did not install the device until 11 days after 
the warrant was issued.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 
(U.S. filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *3. 
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specificity, but the matter would still depend on the accompanying facts 
that the officer presents. 
The second aspect goes to the officer’s investigatory need for a GPS 
device.  There should be a sufficient nexus between the officer’s need for 
the device and the suspected criminal activity.169  For example, it would 
not be permissible for the officer to state a suspicion that the subject is 
“using an illicit drug” if later in the declaration the officer’s reason for 
requesting GPS is that he or she wants to learn where a drug lab may be 
located.  The relationship between suspected drug use and the officer’s 
need for a GPS device would be too attenuated, as tracking a suspected 
drug user’s movements is unlikely to reveal a clandestine site where the 
drug use occurs.  In this regard, the declaration should be consistent 
throughout: the means (GPS monitoring) should correlate with the ends 
(the need to covertly learn of a suspect’s whereabouts or movements). 
The third aspect aims to limit utilization of GPS to aiding those 
investigations for which it is clearly needed.  The prevalence of 
sophisticated and heavily financed criminal networks necessitates that 
law enforcement agencies have access to GPS technology.170  When 
surveillance operations involve clever and powerful cartels or violent 
subjects, GPS would provide a tactical advantage for the police by 
allowing them to monitor their subjects from a safe distance.171
The fourth factor addresses the issue of prolonged surveillance and 
would make the officer aware of the bright-line limitation.  Any 
information gathered after the deactivation date should be subject to 
169 See generally United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A warrant 
application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been committed—the 
‘commission’ element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place to be 
searched—the so-called ‘nexus’ element.”). 
170 Frank J. Marine, The Threats Posed by Transnational Crimes and Organized Crime 
Groups, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE COMBAT OF ORGANIZED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 25 (1999), 
available at www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no54/no54.pdf (“[M]odern advanced 
telecommunications and information systems that are used in legitimate . . . activity can also be used 
by criminal networks to improve their own communication and to quickly carry out criminal 
transactions . . . .”). 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 458 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing 
the difficulty of surveilling Hell’s Angels: “They frequently reside at locations owned or rented by 
others, and use other people’s names to register vehicles and obtain utilities and services, in an 
attempt to avoid identification by law enforcement. Jecko stated that Hell’s Angels often reside in 
rural locations, where stationery surveillance could easily be detected. They monitor police 
frequencies using scanners and use counter-surveillance techniques, such as periodically 
photographing surrounding areas in order to discover law enforcement surveillance equipment such 
as pole cameras.”); see also United States v. Dadanovic, No. 09-63-ART, 2010 WL 3620251, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010) (discussing how several suspects of a particular investigation lived in rural 
areas so that the officers following the suspects in a police car might easily have alerted the 
suspects).
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exclusion.  If a defendant later wishes to challenge the search, the 
defense attorney could subpoena the declaration from the prosecutor’s 
office.  With access to the declaration, a prosecutor could readily 
determine when an officer’s express reasoning for employing GPS 
devices is unfounded and dismiss the charges before the suppression 
motion, thereby improving judicial economy. 
Lastly, when the officer initiates the GPS surveillance, he or she 
would be required to attach the device while the vehicle is parked in a 
public place, not in the curtilage of the suspect’s home.  This procedural 
declaration written under penalty of perjury would force the officer to 
evaluate the need for GPS and thereby help to confine its usage within 
constitutional boundaries.  Requiring reasonable suspicion, as opposed to 
probable cause, would allow police to utilize the technology during the 
early stages of their investigations when they are still gathering evidence 
on their suspects. 
CONCLUSION
When the Court considers Jones, it must be careful not to deprive 
the police of the practical benefits of GPS technology.  Requiring 
officers to obtain search warrants before utilizing GPS technology to 
help them covertly investigate criminal networks would, in many 
instances, defeat the purpose of the device.172 Maynard and Pineda-
Moreno demonstrated that Supreme Court case law provides inadequate 
guidance when it is applied to GPS surveillance operations.173
“Reasonable Suspicion Plus” would permit law enforcement to utilize 
GPS technology only when doing so would help advance a legitimate 
purpose, and thus would alleviate fears that officers might abuse the 
technology.
172 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed 
Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24 (“Although in some investigations the government could 
establish probable cause and obtain a warrant before using a GPS device, federal law enforcement 
agencies frequently use tracking devices early in investigations, before suspicions have ripened into 
probable cause.”) (emphasis added). 
173 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing to Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
284-85, the 7th Circuit noted “the Court left open the question whether installing the device in the 
vehicle converted the subsequent tracking into a search”). 
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